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Abstract
Payment channel networks are supposed to overcome tech-
nical scalability limitations of blockchain infrastructure by
employing a special overlay network with fast payment con-
firmation and only sporadic settlement of netted transactions
on the blockchain. However, they introduce economic rout-
ing constraints that limit decentralized scalability and are
currently not well understood. In this paper, we model the
economic incentives for participants in payment channel
networks. We provide the first formal model of payment
channel economics and analyze how the cheapest path can
be found. Additionally, our simulation assesses the long-term
evolution of a payment channel network. We find that even
for small routing fees, sometimes it is cheaper to settle the
transaction directly on the blockchain.
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1 Introduction
Current public blockchain systems such as Bitcoin or Ethereum
maintain their secure, unique global state property by high
levels of data replication. Thus they do not scale with re-
spect to transaction throughput, since the coordination and
SERIAL’17, December 11–15, 2017, Las Vegas, NV, USA
© 2017 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed
to Association for Computing Machinery.
This is the author’s version of the work. It is posted here for your personal
use. Not for redistribution. The definitive Version of Record was published in
Proceedings of SERIAL’17: ScalablE and Resilient InfrAstructures for distributed
Ledgers, December 11–15, 2017 , https://doi.org/10.1145/3152824.3152826.
communication overhead for replication significantly re-
duces performance. The main bottleneck is the possible num-
ber of transactions per second, that is, changes that can be
written to the underlying blockchain database. One of the
most promising approaches to make blockchains scalable
are off-chain state channels [5]. The approach builds upon
the idea of setting up bilateral connections, so-called chan-
nels, between pairs of nodes of a blockchain network. The
blockchain is only used to open and close the channels and
resolve disputes about the current netted amount of previous
bilateral transactions. Off-chain state channels are useful, for
example, in the context of bilateral payments that can take
place within such a channel. Signed transactions can be sent
between the parties in both directions and a bilateral ledger
is updated with every transaction. Only the final state, i.e.,
the result of netting all transactions of that bilateral ledger,
is persisted in the blockchain if one of the participants de-
cides to close the channel. These state channels concerning
payments are referred to as payment channels. Payment
channels lead to a higher transaction throughput, since only
netted transactions are written to the blockchain instead of
intermediate states. Payments between nodes that have no
direct bilateral connection are routed through the network
of bilateral channels of other nodes.
Payment channels were, up to now, considered mostly
from a technical perspective in terms of saving bandwidth,
preventing blockchain bloat, and enabling cheating resis-
tance. However, the influence of the economic perspective
on usability and feasibility of payment channels was at most
considered as an afterthought. This is similar to the case
of IPv6 where development focused on engineering aspects
instead of how to incentivize protocol adoption, leading to
the situation that IPv6 is not widely used in practice [4].
Although several payment channel protocols have been
proposed, none of them is tested or fully implemented [5].
However, previous studies already pointed out the technical
challenges of routing in payment channels [8]. Finding a
path through the dynamic, unstructured network topology
of a payment channel network is a technically demanding
problem. This is especially the case if the network grows to
sizes that are reasonable for day-to-day payments.
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All current payment channel protocol proposals require an
initial deposit by both parties who set up a bilateral channel.
This technical requirement results in capital binding at the
opening of a payment channel for the duration of the lifetime
of the channel. Capital binding economically implies the
necessity for remuneration in form of fees. Such an economic
perspective has been the focus of the work of Miller et al. [6],
who propose changes to a payment channel protocol based
on Ethereum in order to lower the maximum duration of the
settlement. However, the open question regarding technical
and economical feasibility remains unanswered.
Against this background, we analyze a generic payment
channel protocol regarding its technical and economical fea-
sibility. The overall goal is to answer the following research
question: What are the implications of economic incentives
for routing in and usage of payment channel networks?
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In
the next section we explain the necessary background of
payment channels. Section 3 discusses the main challenges
of routing in payment channel networks. We discuss how
to compute the cheapest route in Section 4. In Section 5 we
evaluate the routing mechanics in payment channels relying
on a simulation. We conclude with Section 6.
2 Background
For Bitcoin two main proposals of bidirectional payment
channels currently exist: duplex micropayment channels
(DMC) [2] and the Lightning network [7]. A good overview
of the technical details of payment channels is given by
McCorry et al. [5]. Both mechanisms consist of three phases:
Setup Phase: In the first phase, two parties set up a bilat-
eral payment channel between them. Either party needs to
allocate an amount of coins to prove that it is able to pay the
subsequent transactions. This amount is called the capacity
of the channel. It can differ in the two directions and is the
maximum total amount that can be routed in each direction.
Trading Phase: In the second phase, each of the two
parties can send multiple signed transactions to the other
party, where subsequent transactions have priority over the
previous ones. This enables to retain the strong security
properties of the blockchain since no party can cheat by
committing an older transaction to the ledger. In DMC, pri-
ority of transactions is achieved by a timelocking mechanism
which enables a later transaction to be spent earlier than
previous transactions. In Lightning, the priority of trans-
actions is implemented by continuously revoking the old
transactions. If one party includes a revoked transaction in
the blockchain, the other party can issue a penalty to claim
all bitcoins in the channel.
Settlement Phase: The third phase of current payment
channel proposals consists of closing the channel. This can
be necessary if the channel is not needed anymore or if the
initial capacity of the channel is depleted, i.e., one partici-
pant has received all the money the other party has initially
deposited and thus no further transactions are possible in
this direction. Depending on the implementation, capacity
can be replenished.
The two already mentioned proposals, DMC and Light-
ning, are running on an unspent transaction output (UTXO)
based blockchain, that is the Bitcoin blockchain. In con-
trast, a third implementation currently under development—
the Raiden Network (http://raiden.network)—relies on the
account state-based Ethereum blockchain. The three gen-
eral phases described above also occur in Raiden, however,
the technical implementation differs significantly. In UTXO
blockchains, smart contracts are special output conditions
specified in program code which is attached to transactions.
In Raiden, a channel is a smart contract that contains the
channel setup properties and is represented by a separate
account which is created when the smart contract code is
deployed on the Ethereum blockchain. Nonetheless, the func-
tionality provided by Raiden is comparable to DMC and
Lightning, at least if compared on the abstract level of inves-
tigation in this work.
Raiden additionally implements auxiliary smart contracts
which are deployed to the public Ethereum blockchain to
support, for example, the tracking of existing channels and
hence facilitate the routing of a payment over multiple hops.
Raiden provides additional features which facilitate recover-
ing the state of off-chain channels when restarting a node.
It is worth noting here, that nodes involved in a transaction
must be online during the time the transaction is performed.
The closing of channels could, however, be supported by
third parties who monitor the closing of channels on behalf
of the party that is offline when the opposite party closes
the channel.
All three—Raiden, DMC, and Lightning—support routing
of transactions over multiple hops. A user A can send a
payment via a node B to C if payment channels are set up
between A and B, and between B and C . To achieve this, A
sends its payment to B and then B sends the corresponding
amount to C , possibly deducting a routing fee. These two
transactions use hashed timelocks (HTLC) to enforce depen-
dency [2]. Thus, either none or both of the payments are
processed.
Since each node needs to have sufficient capacity for its
payments, routing a payment of sizeX along each of the n−1
edges between n nodes requires each channel to have a ca-
pacity of at least X units of the underlying (crypto)currency.
Consequently, in total O(Xn) capital needs to be locked to
route a transaction of size X over n hops. In addition to the
capacity constraints, economic routing considerations arise,
since intermediate nodes may demand a premium for their
cost of capital binding and operating a node in the network.
Thus, senders aim to minimize their cost of transferring their
transactions instead of the number of hops.
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To our best knowledge, optimal routing algorithms in pay-
ment channel networks are currently a neglected problem
and demand further research. While the work of Prihodko
et al. [8] provides a first step in this direction by proposing
a routing algorithm for establishing routes between trans-
action partners, it fails to take the full financial dimension
into account.
3 Challenges
Beyond problems of traditional routing scenarios, like chang-
ing topologies, payment channel networks need to deal with
additional economically induced challenges.
First, the state of payment channels is changing with every
transfer due to updated balances. Hence, the capacities of
the network graph’s edges are highly dynamic as a result of
the design of payment channels. This affects the transaction
amount which can be routed over a channel. In addition,
every node along the route of a transaction is remunerated
by taking a fee for every forwarded transfer. These fees can
change over time at the discretion of every node. Hence,
not only the capacities are changing over time, but also
the costs per node. Increasing fees at a node may lead to
paths becoming invalid, since the capacity is not sufficient
anymore. Further, after a first transaction has been routed,
the same path may become invalid for a second, identical
transaction due to channel updates.
A common assumption regarding this problem is that
there will be roughly equal amounts of payment in both
directions at every node. We leave possible real world sce-
narios in which this assumption holds to the imagination of
the reader.
Second, in all three proposed systems, DMC, Lightning,
and Raiden, nodes are allowed to open channels arbitrarily.
This results in an unstructured network where the identifier
of a node is not related to its location in the network. That is,
there is no data structure or node-ID assignment mechanism
(like finger tables based on data hashes in P2P networks) to
guide the transaction hierarchically towards its recipient. On
the other hand, however, a full view of the graph of active
channels can be obtained either by gathering all opening and
closing transactions (in UTXO systems) or by inspecting the
account of the smart contract that is tracking open channels
(account-based systems). Hence, we can assume that a full
view of the graph is available.
Third, channels need to be equipped with enough fund-
ing at setup time in order to route a transaction of certain
size through a channel. If too many transaction are routed
through a channel in the same direction, the channel capac-
ity will be depleted and no more transactions can be routed
in this direction. One possible solution to the problem of
channel depletion could be similar to multipath TCP where
transactions, which cannot be routed along a single path,
are split into multiple smaller transactions which take dif-
ferent routes to their recipient. Another possible solution
could be the adjustment of routing fees in such a way that
the fees cover the cost of the capacity imbalance, and thus
lead to a balancing of the channel by market mechanisms.
However, current implementations do not explicitly incen-
tivize or provide decision support for setting routing fees
appropriately.
If routing fails, a regular blockchain transaction is still a
feasible option.
In combination, these properties of current payment chan-
nel proposals make routing in payment channels more com-
plicated than routing in other P2P networks.
4 Our Approach
In this section we introduce our formal notation, and suggest
an improved solution to the computation of the cheapest
path assuming that transactions are not split but routed as a
whole.
4.1 Notation
A payment channel network is composed of nodes vi ∈
V that are linked to each other via bi-directional payment
channels.WewriteG = (V ,E) for the directed graph spanned
by the channels between nodes.
A channel, i.e., an edge, between node vi and node vj is
denoted by ei j with ei j ∈ E. Since the graph is directed, the
index is ordered, i.e., ei j , eji for all i , j. The capacity in the
channel ei j between nodevi andvj is denoted by ωi j . This is
the aggregated volume of payments that can be made along
ei j . Note that ωi j may be different from the capacity in the
other direction ωji . Over time the capacities in the channels
change according to the payments made in the channel as
described previously.
Each node vi which routes a transaction tx to vj demands
a financial reward ρ(ei j , tx) depending on the edge ei j and
attributes of the transaction tx. In practice it will most likely
depend on the size of the transaction in bytes, since this
corresponds to used bandwidth, or it will depend on the
transaction amount α(tx), since the higher the transaction
amount, the bigger the imbalance which is created in the
channel.
Routing a transaction tx along ei j decreases ωi j by the
transaction amount α(tx) and increases the inverse capacity
ωji by the same transaction amount. However, the sumωi j +
ωji is always constant.
In order to minimize routing costs for a single transaction,
agents need to send a transaction tx via the cheapest path
through the network. We define the cheapest path path(tx)
of the transaction tx with sender s and receiver r as the
directed path P from s to r , where ∑ei j ∈P, vi,s ρ(ei j , tx) is
minimized. Note that we exclude the fees of the sender for
routing its own transaction in the sum.
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4.2 Cheapest Path as a Linear Program
In the following we describe a linear program whose result
yields the cheapest path path(tx) for a single transaction tx.
We introduce the variables xi j with the following meaning
xi j :=
{
1 , if tx is routed along ei j
0 , else
Regarding the constraints we have preservation constraints
as well as capacity constraints. The preservation constraints
assure that there is a path between the sender s and the
receiver r . For each node with an incoming path edge, there
is also an outgoing path edge, except if the node is the sender
or the receiver. That is, for all nodes vi we require that∑
j
xi j −
∑
j
x ji =

1 , if vi is the sender s
−1 , if vi is the receiver r
0 , else
The capacity constraints enforce that the capacities along
the path suffice to route the transaction. For all subsets S of
the nodes which include the sender, the sum of the capac-
ities of the outgoing channels need to support the routing
fee outside the set S , and the transaction amount for each
outgoing edge. Formally, for all S ⊂ V with s ∈ S we require
that ∑
i :vi ∈S
∑
j :vj<S
ωi jxi j ≥ α(tx) +
∑
i :vi<S
∑
j :vj<S
ρ(ei j , tx)xi j ,
where again the symbol α(tx) denotes the amount of the
transaction. If there is exactly one outgoing edge and no
incoming edge to the subset S , the bound is tight.
In summary, we receive the following linear program to
compute a cheapest route.
min
∑
i
∑
j
ρ(ei j , tx) · xi j
s.t.
∑
j
xi j −∑
j
x ji =

1 , if vi is the sender
−1 , if vi is the receiver
0 , else
for all i
∑
i :vi ∈S
∑
j :vj<S
ωi jxi j ≥ α(tx) + ∑
i :vi<S
∑
j :vj<S
ρ(ei j , tx)xi j
for all S ⊂ V with s ∈ S
Since solving the linear program is computationally diffi-
cult, due to the number of constraints, we decided to take
another approach for the practical computation of the cheap-
est path as is outlined next.
4.3 Practical Computation of the Cheapest Path
In this section we describe our routing algorithm for finding
the cost minimal route in the network for a given transaction
as pictured in Algorithm 1. In order to tackle this problem
we make the following assumptions.
We assume that there is a global view of the network of
currently open channels. This is in line with our argument
that the current channel connectivity can be obtained from
the public state of the blockchain. However, only the con-
nection and the initial capacity are publicly visible. Neither
capacities nor channel fees are available in the blockchain.
Our approach is therefore intended for research on economic
properties of payment channel networks.
We further assume that there is at most one payment
channel between each pair of nodes. While this may not
always be the case, we are able to abstract multiple channels
into a single channel of higher capacity.
Lastly, we assume that transactions are not split into mul-
tiple smaller transactions, that is always the full amount is
routed along one path.
A common approach to solve shortest-path problems is
the well-known Dijkstra algorithm. However, the algorithm
does not work in our use-case, since it only yields an optimal
solution if the visited part of the network does not change
during the calculation. Since we include routing fees, by
extending the path we increase the amount that needs to
be routed at each node on the path, thereby destroying the
matroid property. Hence already visited edges may have
insufficient capacity for the transaction and its routing fees
depending on the remaining route and thus are unable to
route the transaction. Consequently, a path with sufficient
capacity cannot be calculated by removing all edges with a
weight smaller than the transaction amount and applying
the Dijkstra algorithm.
To keep the matroid property and be able to compute a
cheapest route efficiently, we reverse the graph so that edges
change direction but keep their capacity. We try to find a
path by following the route from the receiver to the sender
and add the routing fees to each path. Already visited nodes
and edges will not be removed because of capacity violations
as they all have an admissible path towards the receiver.
When starting with the required amount at the receiver, the
routing fees add up towards the sender, who learns how
much more has to be transmitted to cover the routing fees.
Overall, this approach enables us to find the cheapest path
while facing all of the outlined challenges. Consequently,
we can obtain insights about the economic applicability of
payment channels in general, without having to worry about
the routing complexities in detail.
5 Evaluation
We implemented a simulator to obtain insights on the per-
formance and behavior of a payment channel network at
larger scale. This has various benefits over using a real pay-
ment channel implementation, such as elimination of cryp-
tographic overhead and ease of statistical analysis.
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Algorithm 1 Our algorithm for finding a cheapest spanning
tree from the receiver
Input: the graph (V , E), recipient r , transaction tx.
Output: a cheapest spanning tree T for transactions to r .
1: Q ← V
2: T ← ∅
3: cost (r ) ← 0, cost (v) ← ∞ for all v , r
4: while Q , ∅ do
5: vi ← argmin{cost (v), v ∈ Q }
6: Q ← Q \ {vi }
7: for all eji ∈ E do
8: if cost (vj ) + ρ(eji , tx) + α (tx) ≤ ωji then
9: if cost (vi ) + ρ(eji , tx) < cost (vj ) then
10: cost (vj ) ← cost (vi ) + ρ(eji , tx)
11: path(vj ) ← eji
12: end if
13: end if
14: end for
15: end while
16: T ← ∅
17: for all v ∈ V do T ← T ∪ {path(v)}
18: end for
19: return T
The capabilities of our simulator comprise nodes which
can open and close channels with a specified initial volume
to another node, as well as the accounting of the channels.
As the characteristics of the routing fee have a strong
influence on the network, we allow for each node to define
its own fee structure in our network simulator. Initially we
use a 0.5 % fee of the routed transaction amount, but adapt
the fee reciprocal to the imbalance in the channel.
As our goal is to evaluate the performance and applicabil-
ity of payment channels for a replacement of current means
of payment, we based our measurements on real world sta-
tistics. To generate our transaction volumes, we fitted a log-
normal distribution to the transaction statistics that were
compiled in 2012 and published by the US Federal Reserve [3].
According to the data we set a mean of 2.95 and a standard de-
viation of 1.2 for a single payment’s volume. These volumes
are then transmitted between two nodes chosen uniformly at
random. This assumption is in favor of the implicit assump-
tion of current proposed systems that enough payments are
routed between individuals such that the transfers cancel
out—at least on average. The assumption is implicit as there
are no mechanisms incorporated that address channel ex-
haustion. Translated into a real world scenario, this would
imply that banks are not existing and transactions take place
directly between service providers and consumers in every-
day life. Otherwise, channels would have to be replenished
frequently either due to routed transfers or due to own trans-
actions.
The topology of channels is created by a random graph
model known to yield node degree distributions that re-
semble real world social networks. We choose the Barabási-
Albert graph generation algorithm [1] to account for the
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Figure 1. Transactions histogram and methods of settlement for 100 000
transactions, 1000000 initial node balance, 1000 nodes connected according
to a Barabási-Albert graph with parameterm = 2 and 1000 funding from
each side in the channels. The routing fees are 0.5% with an imbalance
factor. A total of 99922 transaction have been routed, among them 1453
where a route exists but is more expensive than a direct transaction and 78
transactions that were settled directly on the blockchain.
power law distribution of node degrees which is common in
social networks. An often mentioned application scenario
is “banking the underbanked” which refers to rural areas in
development countries. In this scenario, for example, these
social structures can be assumed to be realistic even in the
context of retail payments.
Results: Apart from the initial channel network and the
transactions’ participants and volumes, the simulation has
multiple other degrees of freedom. The initial balance of the
nodes, if too low, can influence the simulation as it might not
provide enough funding to open a channel or handle a trans-
action directly on the blockchain. We avoid these effects by
always setting a high enough initial balance. The capacities
of the channels themselves can lead to constraint failures.
At the beginning of our simulation, all channels are funded
with an equal amount allocated in both directions. By design,
a transaction larger than the sum of both balances can never
be routed along an edge. Therefore, all larger transactions
need to be settled on the blockchain. For interactions with
the blockchain, i.e., channel openings, closings, and direct
transactions, we charge a constant fee of 0.41.
Discussion: In the transaction histogram Figure 1 the
number of blockchain transactions is nearly constant from
500 up to 1000 currency units. These are transactions from
nodes with channels where the channel capacity is not suffi-
cient for the transaction. Above 1000 currency units, blockchain
transactions dominate as a nearly balanced channel with a
funding of 1000 is unable to route these amounts. The ma-
jority of transactions with an amount smaller than 27 units
are routed through channels because with an average route
length of 4 hops (3 fees) the total routing fees are on average
lower than the fee for a transaction on the blockchain. Trans-
actions with more than 82 units are only profitable using
direct channels without routing, except when they help to
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Figure 2. Transactions’ path lengths histogram and method from the simu-
lation of Fig. 1
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Figure 3. Routing fee earnings histogram for the same parameters as in
Figure 1 and two simulation runs. The left axis shows the amount a node
with the indicated number of open channels earned and to demonstrate
how many nodes of this degree appeared in the graph, the right axis shows
their distribution.
balance a channel and therefore have a reduced routing fee.
This can be seen in the peak in transaction routes which are
possible but more expensive than a blockchain transaction.
Regarding the path length distribution in Figure 2, one
hop transactions are always cheaper than blockchain trans-
actions, as the sender itself charges no fee. The too expensive
routes of low length stem from high volume transactions
where the proportional fee surpasses the constant fee of a
blockchain transaction. For paths with more than 7 hops,
the transaction amount has to be lower than 9 units to be
profitably routed, so a larger share of valid routes is more
expensive than the constant fee.
As shown in Figure 3, the earned routing fees of a node in-
crease roughly exponential with the number of channels and
therefore with locked capital. This means that the revenue
is exponential to the invested capital. To handle all 100 000
transactions, the 1000 nodes together spent 5576 units to
transfer a total of over 3.9 million units whereas without the
payment channels, they would have spent 41 000 units. The
cost of transactions reduces only slightly for well connected
nodes as they have more direct neighbours to exchange high
volume transactions with.
6 Conclusion & Future Work
Routing in payment channels is a central problem for solv-
ing the scalability issue of blockchains by a state channel
approach. We show that routing in payment channels is
more complex due to economic-technical (econ-technical)
constraints. First, capacity constraints limit the size of trans-
actions that can be routed and induce capital binding. Second,
channel depletion intensifies capacity constraints and is not
addressed by current proposals. Third, current constraints in-
crease costs of usage, especially if common blockchain trans-
actions are used as fallback option. A naive solution would be
centralization in form of routing hubs. However, this would
introduce a system that is orthogonal to the intention and
sole purpose of using blockchain systems: decentralization.
We are working on an evolutionary topology construction
algorithm to mitigate economic issues as well as routing
complexity.We argue that channel topology evolution should
be an autonomous algorithmic process in order to avoid
centralization and to take economic incentives into account
from the very beginning of network bootstrapping.
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